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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ____________________________ 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal from orders of the district court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania requires that we decide whether 
the court abused its discretion in denying class certification 
pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) to a putative class of 
children in the legal care and custody of Philadelphia's 
Department of Human Services ("DHS"), who sought declatory and 
injunctive relief against the officials responsible for operation 
of the child welfare system.  Plaintiffs allege that systemic 
deficiencies prevent DHS from providing a variety of child 
welfare services legally mandated by the United States 
Constitution and by federal and state law.  The district court 
held that the plaintiffs could not meet the commonality and 
  
typicality requirements of Rule 23, essentially because each of 
the plaintiffs' claims arose out of individual (and tragic) 
circumstances and hence they could not claim a single common 
injury and be appropriately entitled to class relief pursuant to 
RULE 23(b)(2).  We reverse.   
 
 I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 This suit was brought on behalf of sixteen children who 
had been placed in DHS's care by orders of the Family Court 
Division of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas ("the 
Court").  Defendants are the Governor of Pennsylvania, the 
Secretary of Pennsylvania's Department of Public Welfare ("DPW"), 
the Mayor of Philadelphia, the Commissioner and Deputy 
Commissioner of DHS, and the President Judge of the Court.  The 
city defendants are responsible for the operation and 
administration of DHS.  The Commonwealth defendants are 
responsible for ensuring that DHS provides legally mandated child 
welfare services to eligible children and families.  The Judicial 
defendant is responsible for the allocation of judicial resources 
for the Family Court. 
 It is a matter of common knowledge (and it is not 
disputed here) that in recent years the system run by DHS and 
overseen by DPW has repeatedly failed to fulfill its mandates, 
and unfortunately has often jeopardized the welfare of the 
children in its care.  Plagued by severe and widespread 
deficiencies in staff and revenues, the system has often 
  
demonstrated a lack of ability to provide abused and neglected 
children with the necessary welfare services. 
 The DHS acknowledged many of these deficiencies in its 
Three Year Plan 1991-1992 (A486-A492).  The Commonwealth 
defendants have also acknowledged these deficiencies:  three 
times since April 1992, DPW denied a full operating license to 
the DHS.  At those times, DPW announced that DHS had failed (1) 
to satisfy legal mandates for child protective services 
investigations; (2) to adhere to the caseload maximum of 30 cases 
per caseworker; (3) to assign to a substantial number of foster 
children a caseworker to monitor foster care placement and to 
ensure that the children received necessary and appropriate 
services; (4) to ensure that foster parents received the training 
necessary to permit them to care for foster children; and (5) to 
provide any child whose records were reviewed with an adequate 
case plan. (A277-A332; A333-A338; A389-A445) 
 The original complaint, filed on April 4, 1990, sought 
both declaratory and injunctive relief, and alleged that systemic 
deficiencies prevent DHS from providing the following legally 
mandated child welfare services:  protective service 
investigations as required by the United States Constitution, the 
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act,1 and state law2; 
monitoring and supervision as required by the Constitution and 
                     
 
   1 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b) (West Supp. 1994). 
    
2
 23 Pa. CON. STAT. ANN. §§6301-84 (1991), 55 Pa. Code 
§§3490.51-.73 (1994). 
  
state law3; safe and secure foster care placements as required by 
the Constitution, the Adoption Assistance Act,4 and state law5; 
written case plans as required by the Constitution, the Adoption 
Assistance Act,6 and state law7; necessary medical, psychiatric, 
psychological, and educational services as required by the 
Constitution, and state law8; the planning and steps required to 
return children to their families or to find them alternative 
permanent placements as required by the Constitution, the 
Adoption Assistance Act,9 and state law10; and periodic judicial 
reviews as required by the Constitution, the Adoption Assistance 
Act,11 and state law12.  
 In factual terms, plaintiffs allege that the system has 
the following deficiencies:  an insufficient number of trained 
caseworkers; an insufficient number of medical, psychiatric, 
psychological, and educational service providers; an insufficient 
                     
    
3
 55 Pa. Code § 3490.61 (1994). 
    
4
 42 U.S.C. §671(a)(10) (West Supp. 1994). 
    
5
 55 Pa. Code § 3130.67 (1994). 
    
6
 42 U.S.C. §§627(a)(2)(B), 675 (West 1991). 
    
7
 55 Pa. Code §§ 3130.61, 3130.63, 3130.66-67, 3130.73, 
3490.59, 3810.35 (1994). 
    
8
 55 Pa. Code §§3130.12(c), 3130.34-35, 3130.73, 3490.60, 
3700.51, 3810.51 (1994). 
    
9
 42 U.S.C. §627(a)(2)(C) (West 1991). 
    
10
 55 Pa. Code §§3130.36-37 (1994). 
    
11
 42 U.S.C. §§627(a)(2)(B), 675 (West 1991). 
    
12
 55 Pa. Code §§3130.71, 3130.72 (1994). 
  
number of trained foster parents; an insufficient number of 
placements for children who need environments that are more 
structured than foster homes; an insufficient number of potential 
adoptive parents; and a host of policies and procedures that are 
inefficient and deficient as measured against the standards of 
national organizations incorporated under federal law.  The 
complaint portrays the impact of these deficiencies through 
accounts of the lives and conditions of the named plaintiffs.  
The stories are quite pathetic. 
 Doctrinally, these allegations comprise four separate 
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief.  The first cause of 
action involves the alleged violations of rights conferred by the 
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, including the 
right to reasonable efforts to keep the children in their home or 
to enable them to return home; the right to timely written case 
plans; the right to placement in foster homes that meet 
nationally recommended standards; the right to appropriate 
services; the right to placement in the least restrictive, most 
family-like setting; the right to proper care while in custody; 
the right to a plan and to services that will assure permanent 
placement; the right to dispositional hearings within eighteen 
months of entering custody and periodically thereafter; and the 
right to receive services in a child welfare system with an 
adequate information system. 
 The second cause of action lies in alleged violations 
of the First, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution.  Specifically, plaintiffs claim that these 
  
amendments confer the right not to be deprived of a family 
relationship; the right not to be harmed while in state custody; 
the right to placement in the least restrictive, most appropriate 
placement; the right to medical and psychiatric treatment; the 
right to care consistent with competent professional judgment; 
and the right not to be deprived of liberty or property interests 
without due process of law. 
 The third cause of action alleges violations of rights 
conferred on the plaintiffs by the Child Abuse Prevention and 
Treatment Act, including the right to a prompt and appropriate 
investigation of reports of abuse or neglect; the right to 
protection from those who endanger their health and welfare; and 
the right to procedures, personnel, programs, and facilities that 
are necessary to deal effectively with child abuse and neglect.  
As with the first cause of action, defendants argue that this Act 
does not create any private rights of action. 
 The fourth cause of action provides an alternative 
basis in state law for some of the claims alleged under the three 
federal causes of action.  These claims include the right to 
protection from abuse; the right to preventive rehabilitative 
services; the right to appropriate and timely case records and 
plans; the right to have every effort made to enable the children 
to remain in their homes or be returned to their homes; the right 
to appropriate services to assure proper permanent placement; and 
the right to adoption services. 
 Simultaneously with the filing of the complaint, the 
plaintiffs sought certification of a class consisting of "all 
  
children in Philadelphia who have been abused or neglected and 
are or should be known to the Philadelphia Department of Human 
Services." (Pls. Motion 4/4/90 ¶2).  The Commonwealth defendants 
moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the plaintiffs 
had no valid claim for relief under any of the relevant federal 
laws.  The district court denied the defendants' motion, but it 
stayed the class certification motion during its consideration of 
this motion to dismiss.  In response to defendants' asserted 
inability to complete the discovery necessary to oppose the 
certification, the district court stayed resolution of the class 
certification motion three additional times. (Order 11/19/90; 
Order 1/30/91; Order 5/6/91).  During this period, the plaintiffs 
attempted to commence system-wide discovery.  They now allege 
that the defendants never produced "much of the requested 
discovery."   
 The district court denied the class certification 
motion in an order dated January 6, 1992, based on the finding 
that the putative class had failed to satisfy the commonality and 
typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) and had also failed to 
satisfy Rule 23(b).13  The court based these determinations on 
its view that each of the plaintiffs had his or her own 
individual circumstances and needs, and that the class thus could 
not complain about a single, common injury.  The plaintiffs moved 
                     
    
13
 The court also based its decision on the failure to 
satisfy the adequate representation requirement, but it 
subsequently approved the substitution of new next friends on 
March 20, 1992, and the adequacy of representation issue is no 
longer pressed.  
  
for reconsideration or, in the alternative, for certification of 
subclasses.  While this motion was pending, fourteen children 
intervened as plaintiffs, seeking relief for themselves and 
proffering a demonstration that children in DHS's custody and 
care continued to be harmed by DHS's failure to provide legally 
mandated child welfare services.  The court subsequently denied 
the motion for reconsideration and for certification of 
subclasses. 
 The defendants then moved for summary judgment, 
repeating the argument made in the motion to dismiss that the 
plaintiffs had no private rights of action under the federal laws 
alleged, and arguing that the plaintiffs' claims had become moot.  
On August 24, 1992, the plaintiffs again moved for certification 
of subclasses.  The district court stayed consideration of that 
motion pending the resolution of the summary judgment motion.  In 
an order dated April 12, 1993, the court partially granted the 
defendants' motion for summary judgment, rejecting the 
plaintiffs' claims as to the existence of the private rights of 
action under the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act and the 
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act.  The court denied the 
defendants' motion insofar as it asserted the mootness of all but 
twenty-three of the twenty-six plaintiffs' claims. 
 On May 10, 1993, the plaintiffs renewed their motion 
for subclass certification.  On October 13, 1993, in an order 
denying certification the court held that the subclasses were not 
properly defined.  The plaintiffs then moved for reconsideration, 
proposing new subclass definitions intended to address the 
  
court's concerns.  The court denied this motion without comment, 
forbade plaintiffs from making any other class certification 
motions, and scheduled the case for trial. (Order, 12/6/93).   
 By this time, nearly four years after the commencement 
of the litigation, almost all of the individual service needs of 
the plaintiff children had been met or otherwise resolved.  The 
parties then settled the plaintiffs' remaining claims based on 
individual service needs and entered into a stipulation of entry 
of judgment (Stip., 2/28/94), preserving the plaintiffs' right to 
appeal the denial of class certification and the grant of partial 
summary judgment as to the existence of private rights of action 
under the federal statutes. This appeal followed.14 
                     
    
14
  We raised sua sponte the question whether we had 
appellate jurisdiction to consider the case since the named 
plaintiffs' individual claims had been mooted after the denial of 
class certification.  Both parties submitted briefs in favor of 
the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.  We conclude, for the 
reasons set out in this footnote, that we have jurisdiction to 
consider the class certification issue, but not the summary 
judgment issues.   
 Because the combination of the summary judgment order (to 
which the class was not a party) and the stipulation left nothing 
in the district court, the orders of the district court are now 
final and thus subject to review.  28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
Notwithstanding the fact that some of the named plaintiffs' 
claims have become moot since the original denial of class 
certification, this case does present live issues.  United States 
Parole Com. v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 100 S. Ct. 1202 (1980), 
made clear that the expiration of the named plaintiff's claims 
after the denial of class certification does not moot the action 
brought on behalf of the class.  See also Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 
766 F.2d 770, 784 (3d Cir. 1985).  Thus, the district court's 
orders were final and the issues presented are not moot. 
 This court, however, only has jurisdiction to review the 
certification decision, in contrast to the summary judgment order 
issued on the existence of the private rights of action under the 
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, the Child Abuse 
Prevention and Treatment Act, state law, and the U.S. 
  
 
 
 II.  THE LEGAL REQUISITES FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION  
 A.  Introduction 
 To obtain class action certification, plaintiffs must 
establish that all four requisites of Rule 23(a) and at least one 
part of Rule 23(b) are met.  Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 
508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975).  Rule 
23(a) provides that 
 [o]ne or more members of a class may sue or 
be sued as representative parties on behalf 
of all only if (1) the class is so numerous 
that joinder of all members is impracticable, 
(2) there are questions of law or fact common 
to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of 
the representative parties are typical of the 
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the 
representative parties will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the 
class. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 The requirements of Rule 23(a) are meant to assure both 
that class action treatment is necessary and efficient and that 
it is fair to the absentees under the particular circumstances.  
While numerosity addresses the first of these concerns, i.e., 
                                                                  
Constitution.  In affirming the Court of Appeals on the 
jurisdictional ground, the Geraghty Court emphasized,  
 It would be inappropriate for this Court to reach the merits 
of this controversy in the present posture of the case. 
. . . Furthermore, although the Court of Appeals 
commented upon the merits for the sole purpose of 
avoiding waste of judicial resources, it did not reach 
a final conclusion on the validity of the guidelines.    
445 U.S. at 408, 100 S. Ct. at 1215.   
  
necessity, the last three requirements help determine whether the 
class action can be maintained in a fair and efficient manner.  
Class treatment makes no sense if there are no common issues; the 
trial court would gain nothing but logistical headaches from the 
combination of the cases for trial.  Typicality asks whether the 
named plaintiffs' claims are typical, in common-sense terms, of 
the class, thus suggesting that the incentives of the plaintiffs 
are aligned with those of the class.  Adequacy of representation 
assures that the named plaintiffs' claims are not antagonistic to 
the class and that the attorneys for the class representatives 
are experienced and qualified to prosecute the claims on behalf 
of the entire class.  
 In addition to satisfying the requirements of Rule 
23(a), a putative class must also comply with one of the parts of 
subsection (b).  In this case, plaintiffs seek certification 
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) which requires that "the party opposing 
the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally 
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final 
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with 
respect to the class as a whole."  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
 For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the 
plaintiffs satisfied all of the requirements of Rule 23, and that 
the district court abused its discretion in denying class 
certification on the grounds that plaintiffs failed to comply 
with subsections (a)(2) (commonality), (a)(3) (typicality), and 
  
(b)(2) (appropriateness of class relief) of Rule 23.15  There is, 
as we have noted, no dispute over numerosity ((a)(1)) or adequacy 
of representation ((a)(4)). 
 The concepts of commonality and typicality are broadly 
defined and tend to merge.  See 7A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1764, at 247 (1986).  Both criteria seek to 
assure that the action can be practically and efficiently 
maintained and that the interests of the absentees will be fairly 
and adequately represented.  See General Tel. Co. of Southwest v. 
Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13, 102 S. Ct. 2364, 2370 n.13 
(1982).  Despite their similarity, however, commonality and 
typicality are distinct requirements under Rule 23.  See Hassine 
v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 176 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1988) 
("'[C]ommonality' like 'numerosity' evaluates the sufficiency of 
the class itself, and 'typicality' like 'adequacy of 
representation' evaluates the sufficiency of the named plaintiff 
. . ."); Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 810 (3d Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985).   
 We turn to a more particularized discussion of these 
requisites.  We underscore at the outset, however, that neither 
of these requirements mandates that all putative class members 
share identical claims, see Hassine, 846 F.2d at 176-77; Weiss, 
745 F.2d at 809; WRIGHT, ET AL., § 1763, at 198, and that factual 
                     
    
15
 Denial of class certification is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion.   Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 
923 (3d Cir. 1992); Winston v. Children & Youth Services, 948 
F.2d 1380, 1392 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 2303 (1992).  
Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 299 (3d Cir. 1992).   
  
differences among the claims of the putative class members do not 
defeat certification.  See Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770 (3d 
Cir. 1985) (certifying securities fraud class action despite 
differences in injuries); Troutman v. Cohen, 661 F. Supp. 802, 
811 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (certifying subclass of 1,973 nursing home 
patients challenging reductions in their level of nursing care 
designations over typicality and commonality objections "because 
it is not the unique facts of the individual appeals which give 
rise to this action but rather the decision making process"). 
  
 B.  Commonality  
 The commonality requirement will be satisfied if the 
named plaintiffs share at least one question of fact or law with 
the grievances of the prospective class.  Weiss, 745 F.2d at 808-
09; In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Lit., 818 F.2d 145, 166-67 
(2d Cir. 1987).  Because the requirement may be satisfied by a 
single common issue, it is easily met, as at least one treatise 
has noted.  See H. NEWBERG & A. CONTE, 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3.10, 
at 3-50 (1992).  Furthermore, class members can assert such a 
single common complaint even if they have not all suffered actual 
injury; demonstrating that all class members are subject to the 
same harm will suffice.  Hassine, 846 F.2d at 177-78; cf. Riley 
v. Jeffes, 777 F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding 
constitutional violation in prisoners' being subject to constant 
threat of violence and sexual assault and rejecting contention 
that plaintiff must actually be assaulted before obtaining 
relief).    
  
 Challenges to a program's compliance with the mandates 
of its enabling legislation, even where plaintiff-beneficiaries 
are differently impacted by the violations, have satisfied the 
commonality requirement.  See 3B JAMES W. MOORE & JOHN E. KENNEDY, 
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 23.06-1, at 23-162 (1993) (citing cases).  
Courts appear to consider "common" such challenges based on 
alleged violations of statutory standards.  See Liberty Alliance 
of the Blind v. Califano, 568 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1977) (certifying 
class of blind recipients challenging regulations for calculation 
of Supplemental Security Income benefits); Appleyard v. Wallace, 
754 F.2d 955 (11th Cir. 1985) (certifying class challenging 
regulations pertaining to receipt of Medicaid benefits despite 
factual differences among claims).  Moreover, because they do not 
also involve an individualized inquiry for the determination of 
damage awards, injunctive actions "by their very nature often 
present common questions satisfying Rule 23(a)(2)."  7A WRIGHT ET 
AL., § 1763, at 201. 
 To the extent that the defendants assert that 
commonality requirements cannot be met in this case because of 
the individualized circumstances of the children, their argument 
has been squarely rejected by the Supreme Court.  In Califano v. 
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 99 S.Ct. 2545 (1979), plaintiffs 
challenged the adequacy of the procedures used to recoup 
overpayments under the Social Security Act.  Rejecting an 
argument that the applicable statute only invited suits by 
individuals, the court explained that "class relief is consistent 
with the need for case-by-case adjudication," especially where 
  
"[i]t is unlikely that differences in the factual background of 
each claim will affect the outcome of the legal issue."  Id. at 
701, 99 S. Ct. at 2557.  This is especially true where plaintiffs 
request declaratory and injunctive relief against a defendant 
engaging in a common course of conduct toward them, and there is 
therefore no need for individualized determinations of the 
propriety of injunctive relief.  See 7A WRIGHT ET AL., § 1763 at 
203.  Indeed, (b)(2) classes have been certified in a legion of 
civil rights cases where commonality findings were based 
primarily on the fact that defendant's conduct is central to the 
claims of all class members irrespective of their individual 
circumstances and the disparate effects of the conduct. Id. at 
219.   
 In Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1988), 
plaintiffs claimed that the conditions at the Graterford prison 
violated their constitutional rights.  Reversing the district 
court's denial of certification on commonality grounds, this 
court explained that Rule 23 did not require all plaintiffs 
actually to suffer the same injury; rather, the fact that the 
plaintiffs were subject to the injury, that they faced the 
immediate threat of these injuries, sufficed for Rule 23. In 
particular, the Hassine panel explained that the named plaintiffs 
could attack the inadequate mental health care provided at the 
prison despite the fact that none of them were in current need of 
those services;  it was enough that they challenged the 
"inadequacy of the provision of any health care service, to which 
  
they are entitled, and which they might at some time require."  
Hassine, 846 F.2d at 178 n.5.  
 Even where individual facts and circumstances do become 
important to the resolution, class treatment is not precluded.  
Classes can be certified for certain particularized issues, and, 
under well-established principles of modern case management, 
actions are frequently  bifurcated.  In Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 
F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1985), we held that a securities fraud case 
against three separate partnerships, and hence three different 
general partners, met the commonality requirement.  The 
individual damage determinations could be made, we explained, at 
a separate phase of the trial, but the class phase could resolve 
the central issue of liability for the alleged misrepresentations 
and omissions.   
  
 C.  Typicality  
 The typicality inquiry is intended to assess whether 
the action can be efficiently maintained as a class and whether 
the named plaintiffs have incentives that align with those of 
absent class members so as to assure that the absentees' 
interests will be fairly represented.  3B MOORE & KENNEDY, ¶ 23.06-
02; 1 NEWBERG & CONTE, § 3.13.  The typicality criterion is 
intended to preclude certification of those cases where the legal 
theories of the named plaintiffs potentially conflict with those 
of the absentees by requiring that the common claims are 
comparably central to the claims of the named plaintiffs as to 
the claims of the absentees.  See Weiss, 745 F.2d at 810. 
  
 "Typicality entails an inquiry whether 'the named 
plaintiff's individual circumstances are markedly different or . 
. . the legal theory upon which the claims are based differs from 
that upon which the claims of other class members will perforce 
be based.'"  Hassine, 846 F.2d at 177 (quoting Eisenberg, 766 
F.2d at 786); see also Hoxworth, 980 F.2d at 923; Appleyard, 754 
F.2d at 958.  Commentators have noted that cases challenging the 
same unlawful conduct which affects both the named plaintiffs and 
the putative class usually satisfy the typicality requirement 
irrespective of the varying fact patterns underlying the 
individual claims.  See 1 NEWBERG & CONTE § 3.13.  Actions 
requesting declaratory and injunctive relief to remedy conduct 
directed at the class clearly fit this mold.  
 "[F]actual differences will not render a claim atypical 
if the claim arises from the same event or practice or course of 
conduct that gives rise to the claims of the class members, and 
if it is based on the same legal theory."  Hoxworth, 980 F.2d at 
923 (citing Grasty v. Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers 
Union, 828 F.2d 123, 130 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 
1042, 108 S.Ct. 773 (1988), and 1 NEWBERG & CONTE § 3.15). In 
Hoxworth, this court affirmed over typicality objections the 
class certification of a (b)(3) class of securities investors who 
had purchased or sold any of twenty-one securities during a 
specified period.  We explained that the claims stemmed solely 
from the defendant's "course of conduct in failing to advise 
purchasers of its excessive markup policy."  Id.; see also 
  
Appleyard, 754 F.2d 955 (reversing a denial of certification of a 
class challenging Alabama Medicaid admissions procedures).   
 Indeed, even relatively pronounced factual differences 
will generally not preclude a finding of typicality where there 
is a strong similarity of legal theories.  See De La Fuente v. 
Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(affirming certification of a class challenging a farmworker 
recruitment system even though some of the named plaintiffs had 
not worked for the defendant company during the disputed years 
and even though it was not clear that all plaintiffs had worked 
in the specific employment situation as the named plaintiffs).  
 Where an action challenges a policy or practice, the 
named plaintiffs suffering one specific injury from the practice 
can represent a class suffering other injuries, so long as all 
the injuries are shown to result from the practice.  See General 
Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157-59, 102 S. Ct. 
at 2370-71.  In Falcon, the Supreme Court reversed certification 
of a class of Mexican Americans challenging hiring and promotion 
actions, which had been affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, on 
typicality grounds.  Rather than standing for the proposition 
that a named plaintiff complaining of one specific injury 
(Falcon's not being promoted) cannot represent a class suffering 
perhaps a different injury (not being hired), Falcon merely 
requires that the class representative prove that there is a 
pervasive violation and that the various injuries alleged all 
stem from that common violation.  Id.  See also Wilder v. 
Bernstein, 499 F. Supp. 980, 992-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that 
  
a claim against the overall child care system states a claim 
against the entire system and each of its components). 
 D.  The Requisites of Rule 23(b)(2)  
 Besides meeting the requirements of Rule 23(a), 
plaintiffs must also satisfy one of the requirements of 23(b).  
The district court alternatively based its denial of 
certification on its conclusion that the plaintiffs failed this 
test.  The plaintiffs maintain that their action satisfies Rule 
23(b)(2), which is met if "the party opposing the class has acted 
or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, 
thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or 
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a 
whole."  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).   
 In Weiss v. York Hospital we explained that this 
requirement is almost automatically satisfied in actions 
primarily seeking injunctive relief.  745 F.2d at 811.  "When a 
suit seeks to define the relationship between the defendant(s) 
and the world at large, ... (b)(2) certification is appropriate."  
Id.  Commentators have also noted that the language of (b)(2) 
does not even require that the defendant's conduct be directed or 
damaging to every member of the class.  See 1 NEWBERG & CONTE § 
4.11, at 4-37.  It is the (b)(2) class which serves most 
frequently as the vehicle for civil rights actions and other 
institutional reform cases that receive class action treatment.  
In fact,  the injunctive class provision was "designed 
specifically for civil rights cases seeking broad declaratory or 
  
injunctive relief for a numerous and often unascertainable or 
amorphous class of persons."  Id. at 4-39.    
 What is important is that the relief sought by the 
named plaintiffs should benefit the entire class.  The general 
applicability requirement of (b)(2) also aims to prevent 
prejudice to absentees by mandating that the putative class 
"demonstrate that the interests of the class members are so like 
those of the individual representatives that injustice will not 
result from their being bound by such judgment in the subsequent 
application of principles of res judicata." Hassine, 846 F.2d at 
179.  But injunctive actions, seeking to define the relationship 
between the defendant and the "world at large," will usually 
satisfy this requirement.   
  
 E.  Precedents in Child Welfare Cases  
 A review of the jurisprudence in this area discloses 
that many very similar lawsuits challenging the provision of 
services to foster children have been certified despite the 
varieties of factual differences that characterize the plaintiffs 
in each case and despite the variety of legal claims any one 
class may make.  Many of these cases also involve claims by 
classes that include differently situated plaintiffs, who were 
not, at the time of the litigation, suffering identical injuries 
from the defendants' conduct. 
  
 For example, in a class action brought in Vermont state 
court,16 the court certified a class of handicapped children 
challenging the provision of child welfare services over 
defendants' commonality and typicality objections based on 
factual differences of class members.  The court explained: 
 Certainly, the plaintiffs will have different stories 
to tell.  However, it is apparent from the pleadings 
that plaintiffs legal claims are based on a common 
factual predicate:  the defendants alleged failure to 
fulfill their duties in providing for a coordinated 
system that protects the welfare of class members.  The 
individual treatment of handicapped youths, while 
important and crucial to plaintiffs' case, only serves 
to support a larger inquiry into the functioning of the 
state structure appropriated for administering programs 
that serve the handicapped.   
Jane T. v. Morse, No. S-359-86 WnC, slip op. at 4, (Vt. St. Ct., 
June 12, 1987). 
 Courts have also certified class actions alleging a 
variety of legal claims falling under the rubric of a systemic 
failure to provide certain child welfare services.  See e.g., 
LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 960 (D.D.C. 1991).  In 
that case the class challenged the alleged failure of the 
District of Columbia Department of Human Services to initiate 
timely investigations into reports of abuse or neglect, the 
failure to provide services to families to prevent the placement 
of children in foster care, the failure to place those who may 
not safely remain at home in appropriate foster homes and 
institutions, the failure to develop case plans for children in 
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 Vermont's class certification statute, V.R.C.P. 23, is 
almost identical to Federal Rule 23. 
  
foster care, and the failure to make permanent placements.  The 
class included foster children under the care of the DHS and 
children reported as abused or neglected though not yet in the 
care of the DHS.  The court certified the class. 
 Another federal court allowed a class of children in 
the custody of a child welfare agency to challenge the agency's 
failure to provide children with follow-up caseworkers to work 
with the family, to arrange for appropriate services, and to 
oversee the fulfillment of the children's medical and educational 
needs.  The action requested a declaratory judgment that the 
policies violated the Fourteenth Amendment, an injunction 
requiring the defendant to submit a plan assuring legally 
adequate care and treatment, and the appointment of a master to 
determine the adequacy of the plan and to oversee its 
implementation.  The court granted class certification.  B.H. v. 
Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1389 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
 There are many additional examples of certification of 
class actions asserting a broad range of grievances closely 
resembling those alleged in this case.  See e.g., Smith v. 
Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 822 n.7, 97 S. Ct. 
2094, 2098 n.7 (1977) (perceiving no error in district court's 
certification of foster parents, children, and intervening 
natural parents); Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504, 506 n.1 (1st 
Cir. 1983) (affirming district court's preliminary injunction, in 
favor of a class of foster children and their natural and foster 
families, ordering state social services department to comply 
with case plans and to review obligations of foster care 
  
maintenance program); Eric L. v. Bird, No. 91-376-D slip op. 
(D.N.H. Dec. 16, 1993) (certifying class of all New Hampshire 
children concerning whom the State Division of Children and Youth 
Services (DCYS) had received a complaint of abuse or neglect, who 
are the subject of a petition brought pursuant to state law or 
are entitled to services from DCYS as a result of court 
proceedings, and all children with disabilities who are placed 
either in twenty-four hour residential facilities or in foster 
care and whose families are in need of support services); David 
C. v. Leavitt, No. 93-C-206W slip op. (D. Utah May 5, 1993) 
(certifying over adequacy-of-representation objections a class of 
all children who are or will be in Utah's DHS custody or will be 
placed in a foster home, a group home, institutional care or a 
shelter and children who are or will be known to DHS by virtue of 
report of abuse or neglect). 
 Admittedly, these cases did not (with the exception of 
Jane T.) discuss commonality and typicality; nevertheless, the 
trial judges had to be satisfied that the requisites of Rule 23 
(or its state law equivalent) were met in order to certify the 
classes.  We find it persuasive that these courts have found 
quite similar actions to comply with Rule 23's requirements. 
  
 III.  DID THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
 IN DENYING CLASS CERTIFICATION? 
 
 Appellants contend that the district court abused its 
discretion when it denied certification.  We agree.  In our view, 
  
the district court applied an overly restrictive legal standard 
in evaluating the requirements of Rule 23 and in denying class 
certification.  Although the court took cognizance of cases 
holding that common questions need only exist -- not predominate 
-- for (b)(2) actions, it nevertheless proceeded to demand higher 
demonstrations of commonality and typicality than the rule 
requires.  It is axiomatic that errant conclusions of law 
constitute an abuse of discretion.  See International Union, 
United Auto, etc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 820 F.2d 91, 95 (3d Cir. 
1987), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 921, 111 S. Ct. 1313 (1991). 
 
 A.  Commonality 
 As to commonality, the district court concluded that:  
"Not one of the common legal issues asserted by plaintiffs 
applies to every member of the proposed class . . . .  The 
children's claims are based upon different legal theories 
depending on the individual circumstances of that child . . . .  
The services required to meet the needs of one child are vastly 
different from that of another child."  (Mem. Op. at 7).17  These 
statements are at odds with the applicable standard.  Plaintiffs 
are challenging common conditions and practices under a unitary 
regime.  All the children in the class are subject to the risk 
that they will suffer from the same deprivations resulting from 
the DHS's alleged violations.  Because the nature of foster 
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placement is transitory and thus inherently variable, it is 
unreasonable to require that all plaintiffs suffer from the same 
injury simultaneously. 
 Defendants maintain that "[p]roving systemwide failure 
does not establish that the law has been violated as to any 
child." (Br. of Appellees at 16).  However, the commonality 
standard requires only that a putative class share either the 
injury or the immediate threat of being subject to the injury.  
See supra at typescript 18.  Here, systemwide deficiencies either 
violate class members' rights currently or subject them to the 
risk of such a violation.  
 Furthermore, all of the plaintiffs seek to force the 
DHS to comply with its statutory mandates, and all of their 
injuries alleged here would be cured if DHS remedied the systemic 
deficiencies.  Insofar as the children challenge the scheme for 
the provision of child welfare services, their claims share a 
common legal basis.  Class certification for a similar attack on 
New York's child welfare system was upheld in Wilder v. 
Bernstein, 499 F. Supp. 980, 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("[In alleging 
that defendants] created an overall child-care system which 
discriminates on the basis of race and religion, plaintiffs have 
stated a claim against the entire system and each of its 
components.").  Thus, we find the  plaintiffs' attack on the 
DHS's systemic deficiencies in providing legally mandated child 
care services to be a sufficiently common legal basis to support 
class certification here. 
  
 The differing degree and nature of the plaintiffs' 
injuries also do not preclude a finding of commonality.  Just as 
in Califano, where the amounts of each class member's claim 
differed but where the class members nonetheless shared a common 
statutory claim, the putative class members in this case share 
the common legal claim that DHS's systemic deficiencies result in 
widespread violations of their statutory and constitutional 
rights, irrespective of their varying individual needs and 
complaints.  As in Califano, where the plaintiffs challenged the 
conduct of the defendant towards the class, the children here 
challenge DHS's conduct, which is generally applicable to them. 
Also, as in Califano, where it did not matter that the amounts of 
the individuals' claims differed, it does not matter here that 
the children suffer in varying ways from the DHS's violation of 
its statutory mandates.  
 When it concluded that "not one factual issue pertains 
to the entire proposed class," the district court committed the 
error of overly fragmenting the plaintiffs' claims.  A similar 
approach taken in another case, Ward v. Luttrell, 292 F. Supp. 
165 (E.D. La. 1968) (denying certification to a claim by female 
workers challenging state labor laws that denied overtime pay), 
has been characterized as "contrary to the clear language of the 
rule" and "irreconcilable with the majority of decisions on the 
common question issue."  See 1 NEWBERG & CONTE §3.11, at 3-59.  It 
is true that each plaintiff here has his or her own 
circumstances, but every plaintiff shares the essential 
circumstance of being in the custody or the care of DHS.  
  
Individual factual differences do not affect the central 
allegation that the DHS violates various statutory and 
constitutional rights in its provision of child care services to 
the class. 
 Because of the district court's capacity to bifurcate  
(or trifurcate) the proceedings, the individual circumstances of 
the children, even if they affect the issues presented by this 
case, would not preclude certification.  And in this suit for 
declaratory relief, the court can substantially avoid examining 
those individualized circumstances, for the relief requested by 
the plaintiffs focuses entirely on the effort to reform 
defendants' conduct so that it complies with the various legal 
provisions raised here.  Thus, while the children will 
undoubtedly be affected by the district court's rulings, the 
court need not consider the individual children's peculiar 
circumstances in fashioning its order.   
 The court's heavy emphasis on the factual differences 
of the 6,000 children also suggests that it did not take 
sufficient cognizance of the nature of the relief sought.  
Because the complaint does not seek damages, the factual 
differences are largely irrelevant.  The complaint prays for 
declaratory and injunctive relief.  Factual differences among the 
situations of the plaintiffs will thus not preclude the district 
court from determining whether the class claims are meritorious, 
or from ordering the appropriate relief in the event that they 
are.  
  
 The district court's rendering of the commonality 
requirement also goes astray in its analysis of Hassine v. 
Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1988).  Notwithstanding the clear 
language of that decision, the district court here seems to have 
relied on Hassine to suggest that all of the named plaintiffs 
must suffer from the same harm.  (Mem. Op. at 7).  The plaintiffs 
in Hassine, however, complained of over-crowding, though they 
were not actually double bunked, and of deficient medical and 
mental health services, though they did not at that time require 
either of those services.  It was enough for the Hassine court 
that some plaintiffs might at some point require a variety of 
those services and thus be subjected to the risk of deprivation 
by the pervasively deficient system.  846 F.2d at 178 n.5.  
Obviously, not all of the Hassine class members would need 
medical services, or the same medical services.  By the reasoning 
of Hassine, then, the fact that some of the plaintiffs here do 
not need some of the services that are allegedly deficient does 
not, contrary to the district court's conclusion, preclude them 
from attacking a system that fails to provide those services. 
 The cases cited by defendants, where certification was 
denied on commonality grounds, are also easily distinguished.  In 
Stott v. Haworth, 916 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1990), the court denied 
certification of a class of government employees who had suffered 
adverse employment consequences allegedly resulting from improper 
partisan concerns.  In that case, unlike this one, whether or not 
the asserted violations existed depended on individual 
determinations of the nature of the position of each plaintiff.  
  
Here, the violations exist independently of individual children's 
circumstances; it is established by reference to the objective 
statutory and constitutional criteria.18 
 In Stewart v. Winter, 669 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1982), 
prisoners challenging the conditions of prisons throughout the 
state of Mississippi were denied certification on commonality 
grounds.  The Stewart court was daunted by the prospect of 82 
separate hearings to evaluate under the appropriate totality-of-
the circumstances test whether each of the counties' jails 
violated the plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment rights.  The situation 
here is quite different.  The plaintiffs challenge unitary 
systems and a much more localized service, i.e., the provision of 
child welfare services in Philadelphia.  Furthermore, the 
question of liability in this case can be evaluated relative to 
the applicable (and generalized) statutory standards, unlike in 
Stewart where the Eighth Amendment claims would necessitate 
individualized hearings.  At all events, we are dubious as to the 
correctness of Stewart, and note that in Pennsylvania a similar 
statewide class action has been certified and is ongoing (at the 
trial stage).  See Austin v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, 
No. 90 Civ. 7497 (E.D. Pa. certified March 5, 1992)  
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 Defendants also cite In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706 
(5th Cir. 1990), as an example of a case that failed to meet 
commonality requirements.  However, this case is clearly 
distinguishable.  Fibreboard was a mass tort action seeking 
damages, and certification was denied on the basis that common 
issues did not predominate, the (b)(3) inquiry, not that there 
was no common issue, the proper (a)(2) inquiry.  
  
  In contrast to the cases we have distinguished, this 
case clearly presents common legal issues under the applicable 
standard.  The children challenge DHS's pattern of conduct, which 
is subjecting them all to violations of their statutory and 
constitutional rights.  Because of the dearth of trained 
caseworkers, for example, DHS (allegedly) fails to investigate 
reports of abuse and neglect promptly or adequately and fails to 
reliably provide the children in its care with written case 
plans, with appropriate placements, with proper care while in 
custody, and with periodical dispositional hearings.  Similar 
violations of the rights of children in custody to be free from 
harm can (allegedly) be traced to the scarcity of properly 
trained foster parents or to DHS's lack of an adequate 
information system.   
 Moreover, trial will not require an individualized 
inquiry into a vast network of institutions.  It is only the 
Philadelphia DHS's provision of the mandated services that is at 
issue, and the nature of the violations can be verified by 
reference to the applicable statutes; it is not necessary to 
examine each plaintiff's circumstances to evaluate the claims.  
The fact that all plaintiffs are subject to the risk of 
deprivation of services to which they are currently entitled (or 
which they may at some point in the future require) suffices to 
support their common claim against DHS. 
 B.  Typicality 
 The district court also misconstrued the relevant 
standard of typicality.  As with its analysis of the commonality 
  
issue, the court appeared to rely on the proposition that the 
plaintiffs were not challenging precisely the same conditions and 
practices because the services required by law differ depending 
on a child's individual situation.  However, General Tel. Co. of 
the Southwest v. Falcon, supra, assures that a claim framed as a 
violative practice can support a class action embracing a variety 
of injuries so long as those injuries can all be linked to the 
practice.  Plaintiffs in this case attack a systemic failure by 
DHS to provide a broad range of legally mandated services.  At 
any one time, the plaintiffs do not suffer from precisely the 
same deficiency, but they are all alleged victims of the systemic 
failures.  Moreover, they each potentially face all of the 
system's deficiencies.  A child not currently needing 
psychological services may well require such services sometime 
while in DHS custody.  A child lucky enough to be receiving 
permanency planning, for example, faces the immediate threat of 
losing that service in a system characterized by the widespread 
absence of such services.  Because being subject to the risk of 
an injury suffices under Hassine for both the commonality and the 
typicality inquiries, plaintiffs can allege these harms. 
 Furthermore, the fact that the common theme of 
attacking DHS's systemwide failure to comply with its legal 
mandates is equally central to the claims of the named plaintiffs 
as it is to the claims of the absentees reinforces the 
characterization of the plaintiffs' claims as typical.  Indeed, 
this theme is central to each plaintiff.  It bears remembering 
that the plaintiffs here seek only injunctive and declaratory 
  
relief; there are no other claims that could compromise the named 
plaintiffs' pursuit of the class claims.   
 Because there are no individual claims as such, the 
differences among the plaintiffs do not affect the central claim 
that DHS violates a variety of the children's (putative class 
members') constitutional and statutory rights by failing to 
provide mandated welfare services.  We emphasize that the 
individual differences in the children's circumstances might 
indeed militate against certification if the action sought 
certification under 23(b)(3) because a court would need to 
evaluate those differences in the event that the plaintiffs 
prevailed and were entitled to monetary damages.  In fashioning  
injunctive relief, however, a court would focus on the defendants 
rather than on the plaintiffs. Whether there are fifty or 6,000 
plaintiffs, as in this case, the court's task is essentially the 
same.  The court would not need to assure that every child 
received an "appropriate" case plan, for instance.  Instead, the 
court would assure that the DHS had an adequate mechanism for 
generating and monitoring appropriate case plans.  To the extent 
that some of the claims raised by the plaintiffs truly do require 
the court to engage in individualized determinations, the court 
retains the discretion to decertify or modify the class so that 
the class action encompasses only the issues that are truly 
common to the class.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). 
 Moreover, the prospect of class certification in this 
case does not present the sorts of dangers that the typicality 
requirement was intended to avoid.  There is no danger here that 
  
the named plaintiffs have unique interests that might motivate 
them to litigate against or settle with the defendants in a way 
that prejudices the absentees.  Many courts have noted that the  
"individual interest in pursuing litigation where the relief 
sought is primarily injunctive will be minimal."  Weiss, 745 F.2d 
at 808 (citing 7 CHARLES WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 1771 (1972)).  Indeed, because this suit seeks only 
declaratory and injunctive relief, the named plaintiffs are 
simply not asserting any claims that are not also applicable to 
the absentees.  The common claims here are the only claims and 
must perforce occupy the same position of centrality for all 
class members.  The putative class clearly satisfies the 
typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3); the district court 
abused its discretion in ruling that it did not. 
 C.  The 23(b)(2) Showing 
 The district court also found that the plaintiffs 
failed to make the requisite showing under Rule 23(b)(2), 
concluding that the claims for relief were not generally 
applicable to the class. (Mem. Op. at 21).  In so holding, the 
court failed to give effect to the proper role of (b)(2) class 
actions in remedying systemic violations of basic rights of large 
and often amorphous classes.  While it is true that not all of 
the orders issued will immediately benefit every plaintiff, every 
plaintiff will benefit from relief designed to assure DHS 
compliance with the applicable standards.   
 Plaintiffs have alleged that systemic failure causes 
the DHS to violate various mandates under federal statutory and 
  
constitutional provisions.  Because the children in the system 
are comparably subject to the injuries caused by this systemic 
failure, even if the extent of their individual injuries may be 
affected by their own individual circumstances, the challenge to 
the system constitutes a legal claim applicable to the class as a 
whole.  An order forcing the DHS to comply with their statutory 
and constitutional mandates would constitute relief generally 
applicable to the entire putative class.  Indeed, the violations 
alleged here are precisely the kinds targeted by Rule 23(b)(2).  
The writers of Rule 23 intended that subsection (b)(2) foster 
institutional reform by facilitating suits that challenge 
widespread rights violations of people who are individually 
unable to vindicate their own rights.  See Rules Advisory 
Committee Notes to 1966 Amendments to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 102 
(1966); 1 Newberg & Conte, § 4.11 at 4-39. 
 The fact that the plaintiffs in this case seek only 
injunctive and declaratory relief, not individual damages, 
further enhances the appropriateness of the class treatment.  
Clearly, this action aims to define the relationship of the 
defendants to the universe of children with whose care the 
defendants are charged.  Plaintiffs simply ask the district court 
to declare the DHS's current provision of child welfare services 
to the plaintiffs to be violative of the cited statutory and 
constitutional provisions and to order DHS to implement a system 
that would enable it to comply with its legal mandates in the 
provision of these services.  Furthermore, all of the class 
members will benefit from relief which forces the defendant to 
  
provide, in the manner required by law, the services to which 
class members either are currently or at some future point will 
become entitled. 
 While it is true that commonality, typicality, and the 
Rule 23(b)(2) general applicability requirements all manifest a 
concern about judicial efficiency and manageability, the district 
court's arguments on this score miss the mark.  The district 
court clearly erred by finding that "[i]t would be impossible to 
conceive of an Order this court could make granting class-wide 
injunctive relief which could address the specific case-by-case 
deficiencies in DHS's performance . . . ." (Mem. Op. 10/13/93 at 
4-5).  But a court could, for example, order the DHS to develop 
training protocols for its prospective foster parents.  Such an 
order would not, contrary to the district court's view, "create 
an enforcement problem of staggering proportions."  Id.  The 
district court will thus not need to make individual, case-by-
case determinations in order to assess liability or order relief.  
Rather, the court can fashion precise orders to address specific, 
system-wide deficiencies and then monitor compliance relative to 
those orders.   Other courts have ordered the relief 
required by these types of cases without finding it to be either 
unworkable or unenforceable.  For example, in L.J. v. Massinga, 
699 F.Supp. 508, 510 (D. Md. 1988), the court approved a consent 
decree essentially embodying the terms of the preliminary 
injunction it had previously issued and implemented.  The decree 
required the defendant to review the status of each foster home 
where there had been a report of maltreatment; visit each child 
  
in a foster home on a monthly basis; visit each child who had 
been the subject of a report of maltreatment on a weekly basis; 
assure sufficient staff and resources to ensure that appropriate 
medical care was rendered; and provide a written copy of any 
complaint of maltreatment of a foster child to the juvenile court 
and the child's attorney.  This is precisely the sort of order 
that is requested in this case.  Because this suit challenges 
conduct generally applicable to the class and because the court 
can enter appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief, this 
action patently satisfies the (b)(2) standard. 
 
 IV.  CONCLUSION 
 Because the claims alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint 
clearly meet the requirements of Rule 23, the district court's 
determination that they did not constitutes an abuse of 
discretion.  We will therefore reverse the orders of the district 
court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.  In so doing, we intimate no view on the merits, nor, 
should the plaintiffs succeed on merits, on the scope of the 
court's remedial power or on the appropriate remedy.   
